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Beryl P. ter Haar 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
There are many occasions when society differentiates based on age. For example, setting a 
minimum age to drive a car,1 to buy and drink alcohol,2 to vote, or to become a constitutional 
judge.3 Many of such distinctions are generally accepted as common sense.4 Differentiation 
based on age is also made in employment and occupation, including, for example, working 
time as well as health and safety measures at the workplace. The fact that these issues have 
been regulated by a specific EU directive5 confirms the common acceptance of such 
differential treatment of young people in the EU. It is similarly accepted that specific policy 
efforts are needed to support young people in finding their place in society and labour market.  
 
At the same time, it is widely acknowledged that not all distinctions based on age are 
acceptable, particularly when the difference in treatment is based on stereotypes that affect 
human dignity,6 e.g. presuming that young people are inexperienced, less reliable or loyal than 
older workers.7 Additionally, measures targeting one age group such as young workers may 
negatively affect another age group. Furthermore, some means for protecting or improving 
the opportunities of a particular age group may turn out to be not as effective as expected. In 
these situations, it is good, or even necessary, to be able to challenge the legality of such a 
measure.8  
 
The EU Framework Directive on Equal Treatment in Employment and Occupation (Framework 
                                                     
1 E.g. In the Netherlands the age for driving a car is set at 18.  
2 For Europe the alcohol age of 18 is widely accepted; cf Dutch Institute for Alcohol Policy (STAP), ‘New 
European overview shows that alcohol age limit of 18 is widely accepted, but lacks compliance in many countries’ 
(October 2013).  
3 cf U Belavusau, ‘On Age Discrimination and Beating Dead Dog: Commission v. Hungary’ (2013) 50 Common 
Market Law Review 1145.  
4 cf M Sargeant, ‘Young People and Age Discrimination’ (2013) 2 E-Journal of International and Comparative 
Labour Studies. 
5 Council Directive 94/33/EC on the Protection of Young People at Work [1994] OJ L216/12.  
6 For an elaboration on this point in relation to age discrimination, see the chapter by Horton in this volume. 
7 cf Sargeant (n 4). 
8 Case C-88/08 David Hütter v Technische Universität Graz EU:C:2009:381 discussed in section IV is a nice 
example.  
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Equality Directive, or FED)9 offers a legal basis to challenge such measures. Article 1 FED enlists 
age as one of the discrimination grounds, and Article 2 prohibits direct and indirect 
discrimination on the grounds defined in Article 1,. However, Article 6 FED allows for explicit 
justification of indirect as well as direct discriminatory measures on the grounds of age when 
the measure serves a legitimate aim and the measure is necessary and proportionate to 
achieve that aim. Legitimate aims are rather open and include employment policy as well as 
labour market and vocational training objectives.  
 
Over the course of fifteen years, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) has 
developed a considerable body of jurisprudence on age discrimination. Approximately thirty 
cases is indeed notable, especially when compared with other discrimination grounds enlisted 
in Article 1 FED.10 The vast majority of these cases deal with measures affecting older workers, 
particularly regarding the retirement age or pension schemes.11 A significantly smaller number 
of cases – only five – concern measures affecting younger workers.12 Research analysing these 
cases indicate that the CJEU has been rather lenient in accepting measures regarding older 
workers and more strict in accepting measures targeting younger workers.13 However, this 
approach potentially puts EU Youth Policy under pressure. Moreover, it raises the question of 
whether the Framework Equality Directive is not in fact hampering measures to improve the 
situation of young people. In other words, it should be determined whether the FED is a curse 
or a blessing for EU Youth Policy. 
 
The aim of this contribution is therefore to analyse the effect of the Framework Equality 
Directive, in particular Article 6 thereof, on EU Youth Policy. To that end, the contribution is 
structured as follows. In section II EU Youth Policy is described, with a focus on youth 
employment policy. Section III will briefly discuss age as discrimination grounds and elaborate 
on Article 6 FED. Section IV analyses the CJEU’s case law dealing with measures targeting or 
affecting young people. More specifically, it will critically discuss the following cases: Hütter 
(2009),14 Kücükdeveci (2010),15 O (2015),16 De Lange (2016),17 and Abercrombie & Fitch 
                                                     
9 Council Directive 2000/78/EC establishing a general framework for equal treatment in employment and 
occupation [2000] OJ L303/16 (Framework Equality Directive). 
10 See for an overview of cases till 2014: BP ter Haar and M Rönnmar, 'Intergenerational Bargaining, EU Age 
Discrimination Law and EU Policies–an Integrated Analysis', Report for the project ‘Intergenerational Bargaining: 
towards integrated bargaining for younger and older workers in EU countries’ (2014) 18; D Schiek, ‘Age 
Discrimination before the CJEU – Conceptual and Theoretical Issues (2011) 48 Common Market Law Review 777. 
11 eg Joined Cases C-159/10 and C-160/10 Fuchs and Köhler v. Land Hessen EU:C:2011:508; Case C‑ 190/16 
Werner Fries v Lufthansa CityLine GmbH EU:C:2017:513; Case C-447/09 Prigge & Others EU:C:2011:573.  
12 See footnotes 14-18. 
13 eg Ter Haar and Rönnmar (n 10). 
14 Case C-88/08 David Hütter v Technische Universität Graz EU:C:2009:381. 
15 Case C-555/07 Seda Kücükdeveci v Swedex GmBH& Co EU:C:2010:21. 
16 Case C-432/14 O v Bio Philippe Auguste SARL EU:C:2015:643. 
17 Case C-548/15 J.J. de Lange v Staatssecretaris van Financiën EU:C:2016:850. 
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(2017)18. In section V, the contribution concludes with an analysis of the findings in the three 
parts in light of the central question of whether EU age-discrimination law is a curse or a 
blessing for EU Youth Policy. 
 
II. EU YOUTH POLICY 
This section explores three relevant aspects of EU Youth Policy. First, it looks into the legal 
basis for the EU to adopt measures in the field of youth policy (section II.A), defining the 
competence of the EU to deal with youth matters. Second, it explores why youth has become 
such a prominent target group for EU policies (section II.B). Third, it delves into the governance 
regime and the changing approach of EU youth policies over the course of time, unfolding 
some examples of national measures for young people (section II.C).  
 
A. Legal Basis for EU Youth Policy 
In the EU legal doctrine, the field of youth policy is relatively underexplored. That in itself is 
not surprising, since the EU Treaties do not include youth policy as an independent policy field, 
unlike for example employment (Title IX TFEU) or social policy (Title X TFEU). Indeed, only two 
provisions mention youth as specific target group. The first is Article 47 TFEU, which states 
that ‘Member States shall, within the framework of a joint programme, encourage the 
exchange of young workers’. This provision was already part of the chapter on the free 
movement of workers in the Treaty on the European Economic Community (EEC) adopted in 
1957.19 The second provision, now Article 165 TFEU, was introduced in 1992 in the Treaty of 
Maastricht20 and provides the EU with the competence to adopt supportive measures to 
encourage ‘the development of youth exchanges and of exchanges of socio-educational 
instructions, and encouraging the participation of young people in democratic life in Europe’.21 
 
The legal basis for fostering a specific EU youth policy is, thus, limited. Firstly, the material 
scope is restricted to the context of the free movement of workers, education and 
participation in democratic life in Europe. Secondly, the EU’s competence is narrowed down 
to coordination and support.22 Moreover, paragraph 4 of Article 165 TFEU explicitly excludes 
any harmonizing effect of measures adopted on the legal basis of this provision.23 This implies 
that measures cannot be adopted by instruments such as directives and regulations, since by 
definition their purpose is to harmonise laws and policies of the Member States.24  
 
                                                     
18 Case C-143/16 Abercrombie & Fitch Italia Srl v Antonino Bordonaro EU:C:2017:566. 
19 Art 50 EEC Treaty. 
20 Art 126 Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union, Treaty of Maastricht [1992] OJ C 325/5. 
21 Art 165(2) TFEU. 
22 cf Art 6(e) TFEU, which enlists education, vocational training, youth and sport. 
23 Art 165(4) TFEU concludes with ‘excluding any harmonisation of the law and regulations of the Member 
States’. 
24 See Art 288 TFEU for their definitions. 
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Despite these limitations, the EU has developed a comprehensive youth policy, also addressed 
as EU Youth Strategy,25 which comprises the following eight actions fields: (1) education and 
training; (2) employment and entrepreneurship; (3) health and wellbeing; (4) participation; (5) 
voluntary activities; (6) social inclusion; (7) youth and the world; and (9) creativity and 
culture.26 These action fields aim to achieve two objectives: a) more and equal opportunities 
for young people in education and in the labour market; and b) active citizenship, social 
inclusion and solidarity of young people.27 These objectives target an overarching goal, namely 
‘to enable all young women and men to make the best of their potential'.28 The regulatory 
mechanism of the Youth Strategy is that of the Open Method of Coordination (OMC).29  
 
B. Why Youth as a Target Group for EU Policy? 
Why is the EU so concerned with youth as a specific target group for policy? What 
differentiates the position of young people from that of others? It is not merely because they 
are of a certain age. Moreover, the EU youth policy measures do not define youth by a specific 
age. Nevertheless, it is generally considered to cover persons between the age of 15 and 24, 
sometimes up to the age of 29,30 and in statistical data even up to the age of 34.31 Yet the 
more important feature of this group is its possible disadvantage, particularly in the labour 
market. As Sargeant points out, such disadvantage comes in different forms.32 There is, for 
example, disadvantage related to the type of jobs that young people enter the labour market 
with, which are often temporary jobs, e.g. fixed-term contracts, on-call work, zero-hour 
contracts, etc.33  
Other forms of disadvantage, or vulnerability, result from long term unemployment, low levels 
of qualifications and educational achievements, health problems and disabilities, and ethnic 
                                                     
25 For an overview, see European Commission, ‘EU Youth Strategy’ available at 
<ec.europa.eu/youth/policy/youth-strategy_en>. 
26 Council Resolution on a Renewed Framework for European Cooperation in the Youth Field (2010-2018) [2009] 
OJ C311/1. 
27 Ibid, para 1 ACCORDINGLY AGREES.  
28 Ibid, recital 5 preamble. 
29 cf B Laffan and C Shaw, ‘Classifying and Mapping OMC in Different Policy Areas’ (2005) NEW GOV Working 
Paper 02/D09; more specifically, Commission Communication, An EU Strategy for Youth – Investing and 
Empowering A renewed open method of coordination to address youth challenges and opportunities, COM(2009) 
200 final. 
30 European Commission, EU youth report. An EU strategy for youth – Investing and empowering, SEC (2009) 
549 final, 17. 
31 cf the data on young people who are neither in employment, education nor training (NEETs) available at 
<ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-
explained/index.php/Statistics_on_young_people_neither_in_employment_nor_in_education_or_training>.  
32 Sargeant (n 4) 6 
33 For precarious contracts through the lens of EU anti-discrimination law, see chapter by M Bell in the present 
volume. In this context, see also Sargeant (n 4) 6, who refers to research that identified twelve different forms of 
flexible work; S Dex and A McCulloch, Flexible employment in Britain: A Statistical Analysis (Manchester, Equal 
Opportunities Commission, 1995). See also Eurofound, NEETs. Young People not in Employment, Education or 
Training: Characteristics, Costs and Policy Responses in Europe. (Luxembourg, Publications Office of the 
European Union, 2012) 2. 
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background.34 Research indicates that young people are more often at risk to be subjected to 
one or more of these disadvantages than workers above 25.35 This is reflected in the higher 
levels of unemployment among young people. For example, in 2013 the general 
unemployment rate in the twenty-eight EU Member States was 11%, whereas for young 
people this was more than double at 24%.36 In some countries, the difference is not that 
drastic. For instance in 2014, the general unemployment rate in Germany was 5,2% and for 
young people 7,7. In other countries both levels are relatively low. For example, in the 
Netherlands the general level of unemployment was 7,4% and for young people 12,4%. 
Nevertheless, in most of the Member States, the difference between the general 
unemployment rate and that of young people is considerable. In Greece, the general 
unemployment rate was 26% and for young people 52%, in Spain it was 24,5% versus 53,2%, 
and in Italy the general unemployment rate was 12,7% compared to the nearly four times 
higher rate of 42,7% for young people.37  
 
The risk of becoming unemployed is particularly high for young people, since they have to 
transition from education into the labour market. Statistical data from the EU Labour Force 
Survey (LFS) shows a connection between the time young people need to enter the labour 
market on the one hand, and the level of education, on the other. In general, the time required 
for this transition is significantly longer for young people with a low level or a poor quality of 
education (10 months on average) than it is for young people with a high level or a good 
quality of education (5 months on average).38 Unfortunately, ‘young people who face 
unemployment or a slow transition may experience long-term adverse effects in terms of 
future labour market success, earnings or family formation’.39 The importance of obtaining a 
good educational qualification is further emphasised, since statistical data also indicate a 
correlation between unemployment rates and the attained level of education. The data 
                                                     
34 Sargeant (n 4) 4. See also J O’Reilly et al, ‘Five Characteristics of Youth Unemployment in Europe: Flexibility, 
Education, Migration, Family Legacies, and EU Policy’ (2015) SAGE Open 1. 
35 ibid. See on this also M Sargeant and E Tucker, ‘Health and Safety of Vulnerable Workers: Case Studies from 
Canada and the UK’ (2009) 7 Policy and Practice in Health and Safety 51. Although this study is on migrant 
workers, Sargeant argues that the idea of ‘layers of vulnerability’ applies mutatis mutandis also to young people.  
36 Eurostat defines youth unemployment as ‘all the youth (i.e. people between the ages of 15 and 24, inclusive) 
who are unemployed’ and the youth unemployment rate as ‘the percentage of the unemployed in the age group 15 
to 24 years old compared to the total labour force (both employed and unemployed) in that age group’. See 
<ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Glossary:Youth_unemployment_rate>.  
37 Check for these data at <ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Unemployment_statistics>. For 
other data substantiating the same conclusions, see Sargeant (n 4) 5. 
38 cf ‘Figure 2 - Average length of transition from school to work by education attainment level, 2009’ (Eurostat, 
5 February 2013) <ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/File:Figure_2-
_Average_length_of_transition_from_school_to_work_by_educational_attainment_level,_2009.png>. Note that 
a transition is considered successful after obtaining a first job of at least three months. 
39 Council conclusions on the employability of graduates from education and training, 3164th EDUCATION, 
YOUTH, CULTURE and SPORT Council meeting, Brussels, 10 and 11 May 2012. 
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distinguish three levels of educational attainment40 and three age groups.41 On average, in all 
three age groups, the rate for young people neither in employment nor in education or 
training (NEET) was the highest among young persons with a low educational attainment level 
and the lowest among young persons with the highest educational attainment level.42 
 
C. EU Youth Strategy 
Young people have been a target group of EU measures not only since the economic and 
financial crisis in 2008, but from the early days of the European Economic Community (EEC).43 
For example, in 1963 the Council adopted a decision on a common vocational training policy 
in which young people are one of the target groups,44 and in 1974 a mixed resolution was 
adopted ‘concerning measures to be taken to improve the preparation of young people for 
work and to facilitate their transition from education to working life’.45 Youth policy has been 
on the top of the EU’s political agenda since the 1980s when the core of the baby-boom 
generation entered the labour market.46 By 2010, the EU had adopted approximately 100 
measures within all eight action fields identified in the 2009 Framework Resolution,47 
collectively referred to as the EU Youth Strategy (EUYS).  
 
The culmination of Europe’s youth measures in the EUYS did not happen overnight. The first 
step can be traced back to the 2001 Commission White Paper ‘New Impetus for European 
Youth’48 which mainly dealt with active citizenship of young people.49 In this context, 
employment constitutes an essential resource for the autonomy of young people since it 
enables them to fulfil their role in society.50 Another important step towards the EUYS was 
the 2005 Youth Pact.51 In that pact, the policy discourse shifts slightly from the emphasis on 
the role and importance of young persons in society to the recognition of the vulnerability of 
                                                     
40 These are: (1) less than primary, primary, lower secondary; (2) upper secondary or post-secondary non-tertiary 
education; and (3) tertiary education. 
41 These are: 20-24 years; 25-29 years; and 30-34 years. 
42 Statistics on young people neither in employment nor in education or training (Eurostat, 27 July 2015) 
<ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-
explained/index.php/Statistics_on_young_people_neither_in_employment_nor_in_education_or_training>.  
43 See more elaborately about this P Copeland and BP ter Haar, ‘The Open Methods of Coordination as Amplifier 
for EU Soft Law: The case of EU Youth Policy’ (2015) Acta Juridica Hungarica 14. 
44 63/266/EEC Council Decision laying down general principles for implementing a common vocational training 
policy [1963] OJ 63/1338. 
45 [1976] OJ C308/1. 
46 Eurofound (n 29) 4. 
47 Council Resolution (n 26). cf BP ter Haar, Open Method of Coordination. An analysis of its meaning for the 
development of a social Europe, Dissertation Leiden University (2012), 189-193 (Annex 7.1). 
48 COM(2001) 681 final. 
49 For an elaboration on this, see T Barber, ‘‘Choice, Voice and Engagement’. An Exploration of Models and 
Methods which promote active Youth Citizenship in the new Europe’, Seminar Young People and Active 
European Citizenship, 2006. 
50 COM(2001) 681 final, 4. For an elaboration on the historical development of content of the EUYS, see BP ter 
Haar, ‘Youth OMC: Coordination of Governance to Deal With the NEET's Needs’, Ius Commune conference - 
OMC workshop, 2016. 
51 European Council, Presidency Conclusions, Brussels, 22 and 23 March 2005 (7619/05), Annex 1. 
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young people in society.52 Since 2009, when the first signs of the impact of the economic and 
financial crisis on youth employment emerged, the policy discourse has been shifting towards 
investment in young people in order to improve their circumstances, especially on the labour 
market.53 Hence the focus of the first policy cycle of the EUYS was on youth employment.54 
Thereto, Annex I to the Framework Resolution lists eleven possible policy initiatives, inter alia, 
the option to take the special situation of young people into account when devising flexicurity 
strategies.55 The policy focus of the Framework Resolution is amplified by one of the flagship 
initiatives of Europe 2020,56 namely Youth on the Move.57 The aim of Youth on the Move has 
been to improve the education and employability of young people, to reduce high youth 
unemployment and to increase the youth-employment rate in line with the wider EU target 
of achieving a 75% employment rate for the working-age population (20-64 years).58 
 
In 2011, the Commission launched the Youth Opportunities Initiative.59 Within that initiative, 
the Commission identified the following factors as challenges and root causes for youth 
unemployment: leaving school early without qualifications; lack of relevant skills and work 
experience; precarious employment followed by spells of unemployment; limited training 
opportunities; and insufficient/inappropriate active labour market policies.60 To address these 
factors, the Commission encouraged Member States to take decisive measures to prevent 
early school leaving, to develop skills relevant for the labour market, to support a first work 
experience and on-the-job training, and to improve access to the labour market.61 The latter 
includes measures to reform employment protection legislation, to reduce excessive rigidities 
of permanent contracts, and to ease labour market access for those left outside.62  
 
The EU supports the Member States in their activities with financial assistance and policy 
guidance. The latter focuses on the promotion of innovative approaches facilitating the 
transition from school into work.63 Over the course of time, the Commission has launched 
                                                     
52 cf Commission Communication, Addressing the concerns of young people in Europe - implementing the 
European Youth Pact and promoting active citizenship, COM(2005) 206 final, 2-3. 
53 COM(2009) 200 final (n 29), 5. 
54 ibid, Annex 1. 
55 ibid. 
56 Europe 2020 is the successor of the Lisbon Strategy and is ‘the EU’s agenda for growth and jobs for the current 
decade. It emphasises smart, sustainable and inclusive growth as a way to overcome the structural weaknesses in 
Europe's economy, improve its competitiveness and productivity and underpin a sustainable social market 
economy. cf Europe 2020 Strategy available at <ec.europa.eu/info/strategy/european-semester/framework/europe-
2020-strategy_en>. 
57 Commission Communication, Youth on the Move. An initiative to unleash the potential of young people to 
achieve smart, sustainable and inclusive growth in the European Union, COM(2010) 477 final. 
58 ibid, 3. 
59 Commission Communication, Youth Opportunities Initiative, COM(2011) 933. 
60 ibid, 6. 
61 ibid, 7-8. 
62 ibid, 8. 
63 ibid, 9-10. 
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various initiatives.64 The 2016 Youth Package brings these initiatives together in three strands 
of action, with the latter two extending beyond employment: 1) better opportunities to access 
employment; 2) better opportunities through education and training; and 3) better 
opportunities for solidarity, learning mobility, and participation.65 The first strand of action 
includes Youth Guarantee,66 which is financially supported by the Youth Employment 
Initiative.67 Youth Guarantee is a political commitment of the Member States to give every 
young person under the age of 25 an offer of employment of good quality, continual 
education, an apprenticeship or a traineeship within a period of four months after becoming 
unemployed or having left formal education.68  
 
Measures promoted by the EUYS encourage Member States to undertake activities that entail 
differential treatment on grounds of age, or at least distinguishing young people (roughly aged 
between 18 and 29) from all other age groups. For instance, as part of the Youth Guarantee, 
France adopted the Emplois d'avenir-scheme aiming to deliver subsidised jobs for low-skilled 
young people residing in disadvantaged areas,69 and Croatia established eleven Centres for 
Lifelong Career Guidance to all citizens, with a focus on young people.70 In other Member 
States, this has resulted in the adoption of measures specifically distinguishing on the basis of 
age. For example, the Latvian Know and Do-project aims to identify, motivate and activate 
non-registered young people aged 15-29 to return to education, employment or training.71 
The Dutch Work-Study Right entitles young people between the age 18 and 27, who are not 
in employment, education or training (NEET), to receive an offer for a personalised plan 
guiding them to employment or back to education or training.72  
 
The EUYS thus explicitly invites Member States to differentiate between age groups , which is 
potentially at odds with EU non-discrimination law on the grounds of age. At times, EU age-
discrimination law can be considered a blessing for EUYS,for instance when it enables the 
justification of a a measure favouring young people and  similarly, when it does not allow for 
the justification of a measure protecting another age-group at the disadvantage of young 
people. In both situations young people benefit since they provide from the protection the 
FED offers.  The FED could also be a blessing when a measure serves a legitimate aim but is ill-
                                                     
64 For a full overview, see Copeland and ter Haar (n 43). 
65 Commission Communication, Investing in Europe’s Youth, COM(2016) 940 final.  
66 Council Recommendation on establishing a Youth Guarantee [2013] OJ C120/01; Commission Communication, 
Working together for Europe's young people: A call to action on youth unemployment, COM(2013) 447 final; 
Commission Communication, The Youth Guarantee and Youth Employment Initiative three years on, COM(2016) 
646 final. 
67 Commission Communication, Youth Employment Initiative COM(2013) 144 final. 
68 ibid, 5. 
69 ibid, 5. 
70 ibid, 6. 
71 Ibid, 6.  
72 Ter Haar (n 50). 
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designed, and consequently fails the test of appropriateness and necessity. However, at other 
times, EU non-discrimination law can turn into a curse, e.g. when a measure favouring young 
people cannot be justified due to the negative impact on another age-group. The extent to 
which EU non-discrimination law is a blessing or a curse will be analysed in the following 
sections. Section III provides a short description of the approach the Framework Equality 
Directive takes regarding age discrimination and Section IV provides a description of five cases 
of the CJEU on age discrimination regarding young people.73 Section V analyses the case law 
of the CJEU and draws conclusions about the utility of EU non-discrimination law for EU youth 
employment policies.  
 
III. EU AGE-DISCRIMINATION LAW 
The inclusion of age amongst the protected grounds in the FED is not as self-evident as it may 
appear at first sight. Therefore, this section starts with an exploration of age as a protected 
ground (section III.A). Section III.B then discusses how age as discrimination ground is treated 
in the  Framework Equality Directive.  
 
A. Age as a Protected Ground 
The chapter by Horton in this volume elaborately discusses the two most dominant arguments 
that justify the inclusion of age as a protected ground.74 In brief, the first is the ‘complete life 
view’, which argues that when age is taken as a criterion to determine access to goods, 
resources, work, etc., this does not create inequality because over the course of a lifetime 
everyone will be eligible for the same benefits and subject to the same burdens, provided the 
criterion is used consistently.75 The second is the ‘fair innings argument’, which refers to the 
fact that discrimination on the grounds of age is sometimes necessary in order to avoid 
inequality or to achieve substantive equality between generations.76 Both arguments consider 
age discrimination not in terms of protection against discrimination of a particular group, but 
as a necessity generated by the passage of time.77 Both arguments have also been criticised 
for their reliance on false presumptions. For example, the fair innings argument presumes that 
mandatory retirement is an effective way of improving youth employment.78 The complete 
life argument builds on the presumption that everybody will have the same opportunities in 
life, which is generally not the case. Consequently, not everyone is able to gain the same 
                                                     
73 Namely Case C-88/08 Hütter (n 14), Case C-555/07 Kücükdeveci (n 15), Case C-432/14 O (n 16), Case C-
548/15 De Lange (n 17), Case C-143/16 Abercrombie & Fitch (n 18).  
74 See also A Numhauser-Henning, ‘The EU Ban on Age-Discrimination and Older Workers: Potentials and 
Pitfalls’ (2013) 29 The International Journal of Comparative Labour Law and Industrial Relations 391. 
75 See chapter by R Horton in the present volume, where she also refers to D McKerlie, ‘Equality and Time’ (1989) 
99 Ethics 475; G Cupit, ‘Justice, Age, and Veneration’ (1998) 108 Ethics 702. 
76 See the chapter by Horton in the present volume. 
77 Ibid. 
78 Ibid. See on this presumption, among many others R Böheim, ‘The effect of early retirement schemes on youth 
employment’ (2014) IZA World of Labor. 
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advantages and benefits.79 Moreover, excluding people from access to valuable resources 
today may result in a lifetime of inequality because of the impact on a person’s dignity or 
autonomy among other things. Exactly these types of interests are often regarded as the 
fundamental aims to be protected by non-discrimination law.80  
 
It is unclear which argument underpins the EU’s prohibition of discrimination on grounds of 
age.81 However, it should be noted that at the time the negotiations for the Framework 
Equality Directive took place, there were serious concerns about the ageing workforce of 
Europe.82 The ageing workforce creates serious challenges for employment, pensions, health 
care, social cohesion and intergenerational solidarity, among others.83 This has resulted in for 
example a policy on active aging84 and the elderly as specific target group in the European 
Employment Strategy.85 The prohibition of age discrimination is considered an essential tool 
for achieving these goals.86  
 
Nevertheless, the Framework Equality Directive also protects young people.87 Recital 25 of its 
Preamble refers to the guidelines of the European Employment Strategy, which encompass 
specific policy guidelines addressing young people.88 Article 6(1)(a) FED refers to young people 
(and older workers) who may be treated differently in certain aspects of employment.89 
Furthermore, ‘age’ also includes 'relative age',90 which refers to a differentiation based on a 
period of time that is related to the age of another person. An example of such a distinction is 
an ‘age-gap clause’ in a survivor’s pensions scheme stipulating that if the surviving partner is 
more than fifteen years younger than the deceased employee, (s)he will not be entitled to the 
pension.91 
 
B. Article 6 of the Framework Equality Directive  
                                                     
79 Horton in the present volume. 
80 Ibid. See also Framework Equality Directive, Preamble recital 11. 
81 For an analysis of the approach of the CJEU, see the chapter by Horton in the present volume.  
82 Framework Equality Directive, Preamble recital 8. See also C Barnard, EU Employment Law (Oxford, Oxford 
University Press, 2012) 343. 
83 cf S Bisom-Rapp and M Sargeant, ‘Increasing the Employment Rate of Older Workers’ (2011) 27 The 
International Journal of Comparative Labour Law and Industrial Relations 301.  
84 Active Ageing (European Commission) <ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?catId=1062>. See also Ter Haar and 
Rönnmar (n 7).  
85 cf D Kasneci, 'Active Ageing: the EU Policy Response to the Challenge of Population Ageing' (2007) 8 
European Papers On The New Welfare 1. 
86 Framework Equality Directive, Preamble recitals 8 and 25. 
87 K Riesenhuber, European Employment Law: A Systematic Exposition (Antwerp, Intersentia, 2012) 332; C 
O'Cinneide, ‘Age Discrimination and European Law’, European Commission, 2005.  
88 eg Council Resolution on the 1999 Employment Guidelines [1999] OJ C62/02, Guidelines 1 and 7. 
89 See below section III. B. 
90 Riesenhuber (n 86) 332. 
91 Case C-427/06 Birgit Bartsch v Bosch und Siemens Hausgeräte (BSH) Altersfürsorge GmbH EU:C:2008:517. 
On this case, see also C Kilpatrick, ‘The CJEU and Labour Law: A 2008 Retrospective’ (2009) 38 Industrial Law 
Journal 180. 
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Due to its specific nature, age as a discriminatory ground is treated differently from other 
protected categories. In addition to the general derogations in Article 5(2) (indirect 
discrimination) and Article 4 (genuine job requirement), Article 6 FED provides a special 
regime for objectively justifying both direct and indirect differential treatment based on age.92 
More specifically, Article 6 FED provides a list of reasons related to employment policies, 
labour market policies and vocational training, which could be accepted as a legitimate aim to 
justify direct as well as indirect age discrimination. However, this list is not exhaustive, leaving 
it to the CJEU to clarify what could further be accepted as a legitimate aim. Objectives that 
have been accepted so far include policies based on intergenerational solidarity,93 wage 
policies including measures to reward experience94 and measures to protect established rights 
during a transitional period95.96  
 
As regards this list of accepted objectives, it is remarkable that they all serve a public interest 
rather than that of an individual employer.97 In its judgement in the Joined Cases Fuchs and 
Köhler (2011), the CJEU explicitly stated that aims which may be considered ‘legitimate’ must 
have a public interest nature distinguishable from purely individual reasons particular to the 
employer's situation, such as cost reduction or improving competitiveness.98 Nevertheless, 
Member States may be entitled to raise cost reduction as an aim in pursuit of public interest 
aims such as (labour) cost reduction.99  
 
Article 6 FED lays down four criteria that need to be strictly complied with for a differentiation 
on grounds of age not to amount to a prohibited discrimination100 These are:  
(1) Member States may provide that differences of treatment on grounds of age shall not 
constitute discrimination, if 
(2) within the context of the law, 
(3) they are objectively and reasonably justified by a legitimate aim, and 
(4) if the means of achieving that aim are proportionate and necessary. 
 
                                                     
92 Cf  Framework Equality Directive, Preamble recital 25. For an elaborate description of Article 2(5) and Article 
4 FED as derogations, see Barnard (n 81) 369-371. 
93 cf Riesenhuber (n 87) 334 with reference to Case C-341/08 Domnica Petersen v Berufungsausschuss für 
Zahnärzte für den Bezirk Westfalen-Lippe EU:C:2010:4, paras 65 sqq; Case C-250/09 Vasil Ivanov Georgiev v 
Tehnicheski universitet - Sofia, filial Plovdiv EU:C:2010:699; Joined Cases C-159/10 and C-160/10 Fuchs and 
Köhler (n 11) para 50. 
94 ibid, with reference to Joined Cases C-297/10 and C-198/10 Sabine Hennigs v Eisenbahn-Bundesamt and Land 
Berlin v Alexander Mai EU:C:2011:560, para 71; Case C-17/05 B. F. Cadman v Health & Safety Executive 
EU:C:2006:633, para 34; and Case C-88/08 Hütter (n 14) para 47. 
95 ibid, with reference to Joined Cases C-297/10 and C-198/10 Hennigs (n 94), paras 88 ff; C-456/05 Commission 
of the European Communities v Federal Republic of Germany EU:C:2007:755, paras 63 and 65.  
96 See also Barnard (n 82) 371-372.  
97 cf Riesenhuber (n 87) 334. 
98 Joined Cases C-159/10 and C-160/10 Fuchs and Köhler (n 11) para 52. 
99 ibid. 
100 See further: Barnard (n 82) 372, with reference to Case C-388/07 Age Concern EU:C:2009:128, para 62. 
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With respect to the third criteria, the CJEU has held that Member States have a broad 
discretion in their choice of legitimate aims and the definition of measures to achieve it.101 
However, the means to pursue such policies are subject to a proportionality test requiring that 
the measures are both  appropriate and necessary. Analysis of the CJEU’s case law concerning 
older workers indicates that the appropriateness of the national measure is rather easily 
accepted by the Court as long as it does not appear to be manifestly inappropriate to attain 
the legitimate aim.102 The necessity of the measure seems to be assessed in greater detail. 
However, with a case-by-case approach, it is not possible to draw a general conclusion about 
this.103  Nevertheless, the CJEU seems to apply a more lenient ‘control’ standard with regard 
to more general systems of mandatory retirement, while employing a stricter standard for 
early mandatory retirement of specific professional groups.104 The strictest standards seem to 
be applied to cases related to collective dismissals and discrimination of younger workers.105 
If the latter is the case, this would potentially put EU Youth Policy even more at odds with EU 
non-discrimination law than, for example, the EU’s Active Ageing Policy. However, the 
indication needs to be nuanced, because it is based on merely two cases – Hütter (2009)106 
and Kücükdeveci (2010).107 Recently, the CJEU ruled on three more cases dealing with age 
discrimination and young people – O (2015),108 De Lange (2016),109 and Abercrombie (2017).110 
The next section analyses the strictness of the review adopted by the CJEU in these five cases. 
 
IV. AGE DISCRIMINATION OF YOUNG PEOPLE IN CJEU’S CASE LAW 
The five cases of Hütter, Kücükdeveci, O, De Lange, and Abercrombie will be analysed in 
chronological order. Central to the analysis is the Court’s assessment of what amounts to a 
legitimate aim, and the appropriateness and necessity of the measure to achieve that aim. 
Other issues, such as the exclusionary effect of EU general principles of law, among which the 
right not to be discriminated on the grounds of age,111 will not be addressed.  
 
A. Hütter 
The case of Hütter tested an Austrian provision of the Law on Contractual Public Servants 
(Vertragsbedienstetengesetz VBG). The provision states that only persons above the age of 
fifteen can be recruited as public servants. Furthermore, it excludes periods of service 
                                                     
101 Case C-411/05 Palacios de la Villa EU:C:2007:604, para 68. 
102 Ter Haar and Rönnmar (n 10). 
103 cf Barnard (n 82) 374. 
104 Ter Haar and Rönnmar (n 10). 
105 ibid. 
106 Case C-88/08 Hütter (n 14). 
107 Case C-555/07 Kücükdeveci (n 15). 
108 Case C-432/14 O (n 16). 
109 Case C-548/15 J.J. de Lange (n 17). 
110 Case C-143/16 Abercrombie & Fitch (n 18).  
111 On this in relation to the Kücükdeveci case, see eg M. de Mol, ‘The Novel Approach of the CJEU on the 
Horizontal Direct Effect of the EU Principle of Non-Discrimination: (Unbridled) Expansionism of EU Law?’ 
(2011) 18 Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law 109. 
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completed before the age of eighteen from entitlements related to the length of service or 
professional experience. This includes periods of service completed by way of vocational 
training at a university or college.112  
 
The case was initiated by Mr. Hütter (born in 1986), who together with a colleague completed 
an apprenticeship from September 2001 to March 2005 as a laboratory technician with a 
public body (TUG). After his apprenticeship, he and his colleague were recruited for an 
additional period of three months. However, Hütter’s colleague was placed in a higher 
incremental wage step than he. For Hütter, only 6,5 months of the apprenticeship were taken 
into account, i.e. the months after he turned eighteen, whereas 28,5 months were taken into 
account for his colleague. Hütter brought an action before the Graz Regional Court for Civil 
Matters and sought payment of compensation equivalent to the difference in treatment he 
received due to his age, because he considered that treatment to be unjustified and in breach 
of both the Austrian and EU anti-discrimination laws.113  
 
In regards to the legitimacy of the aim pursued by the legislation, the CJEU acknowledged two 
objectives. First, it encourages pupils to pursue a general secondary education rather than 
vocational education; and second, it seeks to promote the recruitment of persons who have 
had a vocational education rather than of persons with a general secondary education.114 The 
CJEU considered that such a measure could serve a legitimate aim within the meaning of 
Article 6 FED.115  
 
With respect to the appropriateness and the necessity of the measure, the Court noted that 
Member States unarguably enjoy broad discretion in their choice of measures capable of 
attaining the pursued objectives.116 However, at first glance, the measure at hand appears 
contradictory: it aims to promote general secondary education over vocational training, but 
then seems to favour vocational training over general secondary education.117 Because of this 
inconsistency the Court ruled that the measure cannot be appropriate or necessary.118  
Regarding the content of the measure, the CJEU considered that using criteria of previous 
professional experience for the determination of the pay scale can be proportionate and 
necessary to serve such aim. However, the additional requirement linking the accreditation of 
experience to a certain age in this measure, results into an unequal award of experience. 119 
                                                     
112 Case C-88/08 Hütter (n 14) paras 9-11. 
113 Paras 13-15. 
114 Paras 40 and 46. 
115 Paras 39-41. 
116 Para 45. 
117 Para 46. 
118 ibid.  
119 Para 47. 
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Thus, additional to the inconsistency of the aim of the measure, the explicit condition of the 
age of eighteen renders the measure also inappropriate to achieve the aim.120  
Furthermore, the CJEU pointed out that ‘non-accreditation of experience acquired before the 
age of 18 applies without distinction to all contractual public servants, whatever the age at 
which they are recruited’.121 Thus, this criterion does not single out a group of persons defined 
by their young age in order to promote their integration into the labour market by granting 
special conditions of recruitment.122 Hence, the Court did not deem the measure at hand 
appropriate for the purpose of promoting the entry into the labour market of a category of 
workers defined by their (young) age.123 Implying that the measure constitutes unjustified 
prohibited discrimination on grounds of age.  
 
B. Kücükdeveci 
The Kücükdeveci case challenged a German measure on notice periods, where ‘[i]n calculating 
the length of employment, periods prior to the completion of the employee’s 25th year of age 
are not taken into account’.124 The case was initiated by Ms. Kücükdeveci, who was employed 
by Swedex since June 1996. In December 2016, Swedex dismissed her with effective date of 
31 January 2007, taking into account the statutory notice period. In accordance with the 
national legislation, the statutory notice period was calculated as if the employee had three 
years of service, i.e. from the age of twenty-five to twenty-eight. However, Kücükdeveci had 
been working for Swedex for ten years, namely since the age of eighteen.125 Kücükdeveci 
contested her dismissal, claiming that her notice period should have been four months – a 
period that corresponds to ten years of service.126 She argued that the measure stipulating 
that years served before the age of twenty-five are not to be calculated are discriminatory on 
the grounds of age, contrary to EU law, and should therefore be disapplied.127 
 
The CJEU held that the national measure disadvantages younger workers in comparison to 
older workers. The effect of the measure is to exclude young workers from benefiting from 
the progressive extension of notice periods (in the case of dismissal according to the length of 
the employment relationship), whereas older workers with comparable seniority will, by 
contrast, be able to benefit from it.128 Therefore, the CJEU concluded that the measure 
constitutes discrimination on grounds of age, and went on to assess the objective justification 
for the measure.129  
                                                     
120 Para 48. 
121 Para 49. 
122 ibid. 
123 ibid. 
124 Case C-555/07 Kücükdeveci (n 15). 
125 Paras 12-13. 
126 Para 14. 
127 Para 15. 
128 Para 30. 
129 Paras 31-32. 
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As for the legitimate aim of this measure, the CJEU accepted the following arguments of the 
German government: :The law, which originated in 1926 and sets the threshold at twenty-
five,  
 
was the outcome of a compromise between, first, the government of the time, which 
wanted a uniform extension by three months of the notice period for the dismissal of 
workers aged over 40, second, the supporters of a progressive extension of that period 
for all workers, and, third, the supporters of a progressive extension of the notice 
period without taking the period of employment into account, the purpose of the rule 
being to give employers partial relief from lengthy periods of notice for workers aged 
under 25.130  
 
The underlying idea of the legislation was that young workers generally react more easily and 
more rapidly to the loss of their jobs, hence, greater flexibility can be demanded from them.131 
Furthermore, it was reasoned that a shorter notice period for younger workers facilitates their 
recruitment by increasing the flexibility of personnel management.132 More specifically, the 
legitimate aim is ‘to afford employers greater flexibility in personnel management by 
alleviating the burden on them in respect of the dismissal of young workers’.133 
 
Based on these arguments, the CJEU concluded that the objectives mentioned clearly belong 
to employment and labour market policy within the meaning of Article 6(1) FED.134 When 
ascertaining  whether the measure is also appropriate and necessary, the Court opined that 
the extension of the notice period is not appropriate for achieving the legitimate aim, because 
it applies to all employees who start working before the age of twenty-five, whatever their 
age at the time of dismissal.135 Additionally, the CJEU considered that the measure affects 
young people unequally due to its impact on those who enter the labour market early in life, 
often after little or no vocational training, and not workers who enter the labour market after 
a long period of training.136 The measure challenged in this case thus results into unequal 
treatment of young workers, especially of those who enter the labour market at an early age. 
Consequently, the measure constitutes unjustified prohibited discrimination on grounds of 
age.  
 
C. O 
                                                     
130 Para 34. 
131 Para 35. 
132 ibid. 
133 Para 39. 
134 Para 36. 
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The case of O challenged the French dismissal legislation, more specifically the provision which 
stipulated as follows:137 
 
The end-of-contact payment shall not be payable: 
[…] 
2 Where the contract is entered into with a young person for a period falling within 
the school holidays or university vacations  
[…] 
 
During the university Christmas break, Mr. O, a student, was recruited by Bio Philippe Auguste 
SARL under a fixed term contract for a period from 21 December 2010 to 24 December 2010. 
On the expiry of his contract, pursuant to the French legislation, Mr. O was not paid the end-
of-contract payment. Mr. O brought an action before the Court claiming that the legislative 
provision concerned was contrary to the provisions of the French Constitution guaranteeing 
the principle of equal treatment and the principle of non-discrimination on the grounds of 
age.138  
 
The main question in this case is not whether the national provision can be justified under 
Article 6(1) FED, but rather if the provision is discriminatory under Article 2 FED. Therefore, 
the CJEU examined whether the situation of a student like Mr. O employed under a fixed-term 
employment contract during his university holidays is objectively comparable to that of 
workers who are entitled to the end-of-contract payment under that provision.139 The aim of 
the end-of-contract payment is to compensate for the insecurity of the employee’s situation 
when the contractual relationship is not continued.140 However, employees like Mr. O do not 
experience job insecurity after the expiry of their contract since they return to school or 
university.141 Additionally, the CJEU considered that other categories of employees in 
situations comparable to that of Mr. O also do not receive end-of-contract payment, e.g. 
replacements for seasonal workers.142 Therefore, the Court concluded that Mr. O is not in a 
situation objectively comparable to that of workers who are entitled to the end-of-contract 
payment, and thus the measure does not constitute discrimination on the grounds of age.143 
 
D. De Lange 
                                                     
137 Case C-432/14 O (n 16) para 6. 
138 Paras 9-10. An interesting detail in this case is that Mr. O was related to one of the managers of defendant and 
that the dispute had been provoked solely and exclusively in order to challenge the provisions at issue (para 15). 
139 Para 33. 
140 Para 34. 
141 Paras 34-35. 
142 Para 38. 
143 Para 39. 
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The case of De Lange tested a Dutch tax measure. The latter reads as follows:144  
 
Training expenditure is deductible if the combined amount exceeds EUR 500 and [for 
training undertaken] beyond the standard period of study, if the combined amount 
does not exceed EUR 15 000.  
 
The standard period of study is the period not exceeding 16 calendar quarters […] 
during which, after reaching the age of 18 but before reaching the age of 30, he 
devotes the time available for work largely to a training course with a total workload 
of such a magnitude that [, in addition to the training,] full-time employment is not 
possible. 
 
The consequence of this measure is that, under certain conditions, persons under the age of 
thirty are allowed to deduct the full costs of vocational training from their taxable income, 
whereas this is limited to an amount of EUR 15 000 for persons who have reached the age of 
thirty.145  
 
Mr. De Lange started his training as a commercial airline pilot at the age of thirty-two. 
Therefore, the Netherlands tax authorities limited his rights to tax reduction to EUR 15.000 
instead of the full amount of EUR 44.057.146 In the reference for a preliminary ruling, the 
Supreme Court of the Netherlands first asked whether a tax scheme, such as the one at issue 
in the main proceedings, falls within the material scope of Article 3 FED. According to the CJEU, 
the aim of the measure is to promote the access of young people to training and to improve 
their position on the labour market. The right to deduct from income tax is, thus, designed to 
help young people by offering them tax concessions that will make it easier for them to study 
during the defined period and, therefore, gain a firm position on the labour market.147 
Accordingly, the tax scheme falls within the material scope of Article 3(1)(b) FED.148 
 
The aim of the tax scheme, i.e. promoting the position of young people on the labour market 
in order to advance their vocational integration or to ensure their protection, can be regarded 
as legitimate for the purpose of Article 6(1) FED.149 With regard to appropriateness and 
necessity, the CJEU considered it common ground that such a tax scheme ‘is capable of 
improving the position of young people on the labour market’, functioning as ‘an incentive to 
pursue vocational training’.150 Furthermore, the CJEU found that given the broad discretion 
                                                     
144 Case C-548/15 De Lange (n 17) para 8. 
145 Para 10. 
146 Para 11. 
147 Para 19. 
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enjoyed by the Member States, the taxation scheme did not go beyond what is necessary to 
attain the objective.151 Decisive to this conclusion was the clarification provided by the Dutch 
government that persons over the age of thirty generally have ‘had the opportunity to 
undertake prior training and to pursue a professional activity, with the result that, being in a 
better financial position than young people who have recently left the school system, they are 
able to bear at least in part the financial burden of new training’.152 
 
E. Abercrombie 
Central to the Abercrombie case is the Italian legislation on on-call contracts, i.e. – flexible 
employment contracts whereby an employee makes her/himself available to the needs of the 
employer.153 In general, such a contract is subject to objective conditions related to the 
intermittent nature of the services and requirements specified in collective agreements. 
However, the same contract may be offered in all circumstance to workers up to the age of 
twenty-five and over the age of forty-five.154 Mr. Bordonaro was employed by Abercrombie 
under such an on-call contract for over a year and a half. When he turned twenty-five, his 
employment contract was automatically terminated due to the fact that the age condition 
ceased to be fulfilled.155 Bordonaro brought an action before the Italian Court seeking a ruling 
that both his fixed-term on-call contract and his dismissal were unlawful due to age 
discrimination.156  
 
Firstly, the CJEU examined whether Bordonaro had been treated differently because of his 
age. Thereto, the Court held that the Italian measure established two regimes: one concerned 
with the access to and conditions of employment; the other with the dismissal of on-call 
workers. Both regimes are conditioned by the age category to which those workers belong.157 
Thus, on-call contracts for workers aged twenty-five years or more and up to forty-five years 
are only allowed under certain conditions. On-call contracts with workers aged under twenty-
five years or over forty-five years are not subjected to such conditions..158 Therefore, the CJEU 
held that young workers are comparable to other workers, meaning that the contested 
measure constitutes a difference in treatment on the grounds of age.159 
 
Secondly, the CJEU examined whether the difference in treatment can be justified. With 
regard to the legitimate aim, the Court noted that the provision forms a part of a legal 
                                                     
151 Para 34. 
152 Para 33. 
153 Case C-143/16 Abercrombie (n 18) para 6. 
154 ibid. 
155 Para 11. 
156 Para 12. Note that the CJEU first considers whether Bordonaro is a worker within the meaning of Article 45 
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framework intended to make the employment market more flexible in order to increase 
employment levels.160 The measures facilitates the entry of young people to the labour 
market.161 Especially in a labour market as difficult as in Italy, the lack of professional 
experience is a factor that hampers young people. Gaining experience, even if it is through 
flexible work and for a limited time, could constitute a springboard towards new employment 
opportunities.162 The measure thus serves the aim of creating special conditions for access to 
employment, i.e. encouraging recruitment. This falls within a legitimate aim covered by Article 
6 FED.163 Therefore, it is necessary to examine whether the measure is appropriate and 
necessary to achieve that aim.164 
The CJEU considered the measure appropriate, since this less onerous and costly instrument 
(i.e. on-call contract) may indeed encourage employers to respond more to job applications 
of young people.165 As regards the necessity of the provision, the CJEU observed that in the 
context of a persistent economic crisis and weak growth, the situation of a worker aged under 
twenty-five years, who can access the labour market thanks to a flexible and temporary 
employment contract, is preferable to the situation of someone without such a possibility who 
is unemployed as a result.166 Additionally, the Italian Government explained that the measure 
is necessary because it provides access to the labour market for people at risk of social 
exclusion and helps to eliminate forms of illegal work.167 It also clarified that on-call workers 
enjoy a number of guarantees, for example they are protected against less favourable 
treatment than other workers at equivalent level.168 Hence, the CJEU held it reasonable for 
the Italian Government to regard the measure as necessary.169  
 
V. ANALYSIS OF EU AGE-DISCRIMINATION CASE LAW: ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR EU YOUTH 
POLICY 
 
The outcome of the cases described in section IV are summarised in Table 1.  
 
Table 1. Outcome of the five cases on age discrimination involving young people 
Case Discrimination Discriminatory effect of the measure Justifiable 
Hütter Yes Distinction by age results in unequal treatment 
between young people with similar work experience 
No 
Kücükdeveci Yes Distinction by age results in unequal treatment 
between young people who enter the labour market 
No 
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after a short period of education and young people 
who enter the labour market after a long(er) period 
of education.  
O No Different treatment is not based on age but on the 
need of protection against insecurity of income after 
the loss of employment. 
n.a. 
De Lange Yes Different treatment based on age in order to 
promote educational opportunity for young people, 
which people above thirty have already enjoyed.  
Yes 
Abercrombie Yes Different treatment based on age to gain work 
experience in order to improve opportunities for 
regular employment.  
Yes 
 
In four of the five cases, the CJEU found that the measure constituted a difference in 
treatment on grounds of age. Only in O was no differentiation found, obviating the need to 
assess the measure further. With respect to the four cases, the CJEU repeated that Member 
States enjoy a broad discretion in their choice to pursue a particular aim, and in the definition 
of measures capable of achieving it.170 Even in Hütter, the Court accepted the legitimate aim 
despite its inconsistency, i.e. promotion of secondary education in favour of vocation training, 
while the effect of the measure is that vocational training favours over secondary training. . 
Unsurprisingly, the CJEU did consider the inconsistent measure in Hütter inappropriate for 
achieving the legitimate aim. Furthermore, the CJEU confirmed that the reward of experience 
can be appropriate to determine the wage scale.  Nonetheless, the Court concluded that the 
measure could not be justified, because the additional age threshold of twenty-five resulted 
in unequal treatment between two persons with similar experience. A similar conclusion was 
reached in Kücükdeveci – the years of service  can be appropriate as a condition for 
establishing notice periods; however, the additional condition of age cannot, because that 
would affect young people who enter the labour market early and not those who enter the 
labour market after a long period of education.  
 
In the remaining two cases, De Lange and Abercrombie, the CJEU concluded that the measures 
at stake were appropriate and necessary to achieve the legitimate aim. In De Lange, the Court 
considered the tax scheme appropriate for improving the position of young people in the 
labour market and providing an incentive to pursue vocational training. Furthermore, the 
measure was deemed necessary, since persons over the age of thirty years (who are excluded 
from the scheme) already had the opportunity to undertake prior training and to pursue a 
professional activity. They are therefore in a better financial position and able to bear the 
financial burden of new training. In Abercrombie, the CJEU held the measure appropriate since 
the on-call contracts may indeed encourage employers to hire young people. It seems that 
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the fact that on-call work is in principle a form of precarious work was not an issue for the 
CJEU. Its conclusion is most likely influenced by the temporary nature of the on-call contract, 
available only until the age of twenty-five, and because it is intended for providing work 
experience which could constitute a springboard towards new employment, and thus a steady 
entry in the labour market. Furthermore, misgivings about precariousness are mitigated, since 
the young persons concerned are protected against being treated less favourably than other 
workers at the same level. In the assessment of the necessity, the CJEU took into account the 
Italian economic and social situation, especially the risk of social exclusion of young people 
unable to enter the labour market, and the objective of eliminating illegal work.  
 
The measures in De Lange and Abercrombie fit perfectly with the EUYS. The tax scheme in De 
Lange is clearly designed to ease the access of young people to vocational training in order to 
facilitate their transition into the labour market. The on-call contract in Abercrombie is an 
example utilising flexible forms of employment to improve the position of young people in the 
labour market. These are the only two measures the CJEU accepted as being appropriate and 
necessary to achieve the legitimate aim pursued. As such, the Framework Equality Directive 
confirms the legality of differentiating rules which favour young people. 
 
The legislation in Hütter could in principle have fitted within the EUYS, since it aims to 
encourage young people to achieve an educational level that will improve their opportunities 
to enter the labour market. However, due to its inconsistency, it is an ill-designed measure, 
and its benefits for young people should be questioned. It can thus be concluded that the 
Framework Equality Directive protects young people against poorly designed measures that 
may hamper their situation rather than benefitting them.  
 
In Kücükdeveci, the rule primarily favoured older workers over younger workers by granting a 
longer notice period for workers above the age of forty-five. The fact that younger workers 
also benefit from the measure is incidental. Since the years of service before the age of 
twenty-five were not considered in calculating the notice period, young workers were cheaper 
to dismiss. This enabled employers to increase the flexibility in personnel management, 
encouraging the recruitment of young workers. In line with previous judgements, the Court 
held that the length of service as a condition for differential treatment can be appropriate and 
necessary. It is the condition of age that makes the measure unjustifiable. The fact that the 
years of service between the age of eighteen and twenty-five are not calculated for the notice 
period results in a difference in treatment, not between older workers (forty-five plus) and 
younger workers, but between young workers aged twenty-five plus and eighteen till twenty-
four. The age distinction  puts young people who enter the labour market at a young age and 
consequently have limited education, in a less favourable position compared to young people 
who stay in education for longer and therefore enter the labour market at a later age. Thus, 
while the Framework Equality Directive allows for a difference in treatment between older 
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workers (forty-five plus) and younger workers based on the length of service, it protects young 
people against unnecessary further disadvantage based on age.  
 
The O case differed from the others as there was no situation of unequal treatment. 
Nonetheless, the relevant measure  affects young people, since the termination of work 
engaged in during holidays is treated differently from regular work. An interesting aspect of 
this case is the Court’s conclusion that the challenged measure is acceptable because the aim 
of the end-of-contract payment is to compensate for the insecurity of the employee’s 
situation when the contractual relationship discontinues. Yet employees like Mr. O will go 
back to school or university and are thus not in a situation of job insecurity after the expiry of 
their contract. In this reasoning, a similarity can be found with the CJEU’s judgements on 
mandatory retirement which is considered acceptable because of the consequences following 
from the termination of the employment contract, namely alternative income. 
 
With regard to the claim that the CJEU is more lenient in accepting discrimination against older 
workers than against younger workers the following can be observed based on the five cases 
discussed in this study. The measures that affected young people negatively, as was the 
situation in Hütter and Kücükdeveci, could not stand the proportionality test and were found 
inappropriate and unnecessary. The measures that affect young people positively, but older 
people negatively, such as in De Lange and Abercrombie, could stand the proportionality test 
and were found appropriate and necessary. The commonality between the four cases is that 
the position of young people is protected. The CJEU shows consistency in its approach to be 
more sympathetic to the situation of young people than older workers.  
 
Although the CJEU seems sympathetic to the situation of young people, one point of critique 
can be made. In Abercrombie the Court could have been more strict in applying the 
proportionality test. In this case the Italian government argued that on-call contracts were 
essential for young people to get professional experience which would significantly improve 
the chances for a regular job. This leads to the question why an age criterium is needed? Like 
in Hütter, the Court could have reasoned that the age requirement was unnecessary to 
achieve the aim, since it could be achieved by allowing the use of on-call contracts for a certain 
period after completion of education. Such would do more justice to young people who enter 
the labour market after a long(er) period of education. With a more strict application of the 
proportionality test, the CJEU could offer an even better protection for young people against 
discrimination on the grounds of age.  
 
With respect to the main question of this study, embraced in its title, it can be concluded that 
the Framework Equality Directive provides the needed protection (De Lange and 
Abercrombie) and prohibits measures that negatively affect young people (Hütter and 
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Kücükdeveci). Hence, from the perspective of EU Youth Policy, the Framework Equality 
Directive has been rather a support than a hinder.  
